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ABSTRACT
*
The polities of the European states system, due to the cultural and competitive
framework of this system, organized around distinct variants of a common
cultural model. This system generated four predominant institutionalized models
of the polity, models which, when delineated, help to clarify the historical
differentiation and development of the modern polities. In addition, these
institutionalized models have wide-ranging effects on social structuration,
agenda and policy formation, and identity formation. This paper consolidates
and systematizes some basic intellectual results on these topics.
This paper takes up the idea that the different national states of the
modern European states system organized around distinct models for
constructing community and mobilizing collective action. This variation seems
sufficiently systematic and constitutive that one can delineate distinctive
“institutional logics” (Friedland and Alford 1991) differentiating the historically
predominant Western polities. The paper concentrates on developing one
fundamental distinction, distinguishing two especially consequential dimensions
of institutional models. While based upon familiar ideas, these dimensions have
not been sufficiently conceptualized and articulated. Doing so would bring
substantial analytical benefits to current institutional and macrohistorical
sociology, as this paper will attempt to illustrate.
To anticipate, the first dimension of structuration concerns the contrast
between more “statist” models of organizing authority (Nettl 1968) and more
“civil society” forms (a now standard contrast in the literature but variously
conceptualized). The second dimension concerns the contrast between more
corporate and more associational models of the organization of society (a
contrast also with a long conceptual heritage). Juxtaposing and then integrating
these dimensions (after conceptual clarification) yields a typology of four
predominant institutional models within the European polity system: four
predominant variants of a more general European cultural model of the polity.
Strikingly, these models delineate well the Anglo, Nordic, Germanic, and (to a
lesser extent) Latin political trajectories, as they consolidated in nation-state
formation during the last half of the nineteenth century, establishing powerful
legacies enduring through the 1960s and beyond. The paper illustrates how the
idea of dominant institutional models, if more clearly established, can aid in
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organizing and systematizing a wide range of observations about historical and
institutional development within the “modern world system”– the primary
objective of this paper.
In addition, invoking clearly delineated institutional models can help
greatly in explaining a wide range of cross-national variation in social activity:
for example, in patterns of formal organizations, agenda and policy formation,
collective participation and action, and identity formation. Illustrating the
current and potential explanatory utility of this kind of institutional analysis is a
second (and secondary) objective of this paper (a task that necessarily includes a
brief characterization of how institutional models generate causal effects).
In pursuing these objectives the paper draws upon and seeks to develop
further so-called “sociological institutionalism” (Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez, and
Boli 1987). It is motivated by a concern for consolidating basic theoretical
results – surely one of the core tasks of any discipline.RSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 5
ANALYTICAL CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVE
There is now a rich body of comparative work contrasting fundamental elements
of social organization and culture in the modern world system. This literature
ranges over variation in organizational practices (for example, Hofstede 1980),
status systems (Lamont 1992), policy formation (Dobbin 1994a; Ziegler 1997),
national membership (Soysal 1994; Brubaker 1992), class formation (Biernacki
1995), social movements (Birnbaum 1988; Rucht 1996), and so on. Many of
these works employ the idea of underlying institutional variation generating
patterned national differences.
Consider a few important examples. Frank Dobbin shows that political
and business figures in France and the U.S. drew different lessons from
nineteenth-century railroad development, producing over time variant “revealed
industrial policies.” Relatively similar public sector involvements were
“concealed” as state actions in the U.S. while “revealed” as state actions in
France. Different institutionalized models of the polity explain these different
understandings (Dobbin 1994a, 1996). Richard Biernacki argues that different
institutional arrangements at the time of industrialization produced different
constructions of labor (and different factory organization) in Europe (Biernacki
1995). For instance, in England a relatively fully developed commodity market
provided a model for the construction of labor as another market commodity. In
contrast, Germany had less developed commodity markets, and instead drew
upon feudal models of service (like the corvee) as templates for industrial
employment – leading both employers and workers to understand industrial
labor in a different way. Yasemin Soysal shows that different European
countries have established distinctive “incorporation regimes” for absorbing
immigrants, based upon previously institutionalized models of national
membership. These models constitute a basic “repertoire” for states and societal
actors in constructing new policy strategies (Soysal 1994:36). Variation in these
repertoires seems to explain well the national variation in immigrant discourse,
instruments of migrant incorporation, and the collective organization of migrants
themselves.
Despite the interest of these path-breaking studies (and others), there has
been little consolidation of the underlying institutional dimensions that might
help to organize – and hence theorize more confidently – the array of
presumably inter-related findings. That is, with a few important exceptions to be
discussed, there have been few broadly generalizing efforts to clarify the
analytical dimensions along which the modern polities fall, since Parsons’
efforts with his “pattern variables.” More prominent in the literature has been an
emphasis on rather narrowly conceived institutional factors (like the features of
governmental structure emphasized by recent “historical institutionalism”RSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 6
[Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992]) or even a historicist insistence upon
unique institutional configurations or even contingency, often coupled with the
intimation that broader institutional generalization is suspect or even futile.
Of course there remain attempts to produce some generalizations about
the basic institutional matrices that constitute political worlds. Most conspicuous
has been the attention to variation in the “statism” of the modern polities (Nettl
1968; Badie and Birnbaum 1983). Others have explored the contrast between
more “collectivist” and “individualist” social organization (Triandis 1995;
Dumont 1986). The field has probably been overly focussed on the former
contrast – degree of statism – while simultaneously glossing over the different
ways in which this variation is conceptualized and invoked as a causal force (on
which more below). Further, the (less prominent) discussions of
collectivism/individualism across the modern polities have tended to conflate
elements associated with statism with elements associated with corporate social
organization or corporatist interest structuration. It seems imperative to
distinguish and conceptualize these (and other such) distinctions more sharply,
and then to explore how such dimensions of institutional organization might be
related. For instance, in an important but insufficiently attended corrective,
Kenneth Dyson distinguishes statist and “stateless” governance from
Gesellschaft versus Gemeinschaft society (Dyson 1980:49 and Ch. 2). Relatedly
Rainer Baum has discussed parallel differences between “authority codes”
(Baum 1977). This paper proceeds in a similar direction, taking off more
immediately from John Meyer’s contrasting of statist, corporatist and liberal
systems (Meyer 1983), and from other efforts within sociological
institutionalism (for instance, Jepperson and Meyer 1991; Dobbin 1994a).
There are two core ideas stemming from sociological institutionalism of
relevance here, ideas also implicit or explicit in a number of the works referred
to above. First is the argument that a good number of the modern polities
(including importantly the historically dominant ones) formed around differing
distinct  models for achieving social mobilization and constructing collective
agency, models having obvious religious and military derivation. The different
models – the topic of this paper – were institutionalized in constitutional, legal,
and administrative procedures, and carried by the various cultural practitioners
who both staff and monitor such systems (jurists, lawyers, journalists,
academics, clerics, other professionals). Once achieving such embodiment in
institutional structure, these models begin to operate as massively reified and
conventionalized collective representations (in Durkheim’s sense, or Berger and
Luckmann’s). The institutionalist emphasis on “models” rather than merely
“structure” is not a semantic matter; rather it is meant to mark the “virtual”
character of polity structure in the European world system (Giddens 1984). That
is, it intentionally invokes imagery of differently constituted and envisionedRSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 7
political worlds or cosmologies, with differently constructed sociopolitical
entities, relations, and operating logics. This highly “imagined” nature of
European sociopolitical development – and the extreme historical and
anthropological peculiarity of its form – is constantly elided in currently
dominant social scientific imagery (Meyer 1988; Meyer and Jepperson 2000).
The second guiding idea is that institutional structures can operate in
constitutive ways, not just as regulative structures or as “opportunity structures”
(Searle 1995; Thomas et al. 1987: Ch. 1; Dobbin 1994b). While these differing
institutional effects are in no way mutually exclusive, the differences and
possible relationships have not been sufficiently expressed. This issue is taken
up later, but a main claim – just to mark it here – is that much social activity and
structure exists not merely in external-causal relation to the institutional models
of the polity; instead, some causal effects should be seen as endogenous to
institutional structure, specifically as extensions or enactments of it (Thomas et
al. 1987:Ch. 1; Jepperson 1991). For instance, the different citizenship identities
and postures apparent across the modern polities are obviously not an external-
causal effect of institutional models, but rather reflect direct enactments of them
– a “constitutive” causal connection in philosophical parlance (Searle 1995:27-
29,43-48).
This paper will briefly address these important causal issues, in seeking to
illustrate the explanatory utility of invoking variation in polity models.
However, as indicated it will concentrate on the necessary prior task of
delineating some first-cut variation in these models. Accordingly it proceeds in
the following fashion. The first section describes main constitutive dimensions
of models of the polity within the Europe-centered states system. The second
discusses how different historical trajectories map onto this typology. The third
section discusses changes in polity models in the contemporary historical period.
The fourth section provides illustration of the current and potential explanatory
utility of invoking these polity models.
DIMENSIONS OF MODELS OF THE POLITY
Recent historical work has dramatized the extent to which the “European world
system” of capitalism and Christendom featured remarkable competitive and
cultural “intensification” (Mann 1986; originally Weber 1927). That is, in its
ecological aspects it selected ruthlessly for polities that pursued an intensive
mobilization of internal resources and activities (Wallerstein 1974; Mann 1986;
Tilly 1992; Jones 1981 for review). Also, in its cultural aspects it spawned
highly ideological and purposive polities, projects organized around expansive
religious and post-religious visions of development and progress (McNeill 1963;
Thomas and Meyer 1984; Hall 1986; Eisenstadt 1987; Meyer 1989). Hence thisRSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 8
“world system” established both considerable ideological motivation and
substantial competitive pressure for “rationalizing” social structures – as Weber
and others have noted. This rationalization involved religious and economic
models for intensively organizing individual activity around various (imagined)
collective goods.
These rationalizing models varied in two especially prominent and
systematic ways, shortly to be illustrated. First, they varied in imagery about
how individual activities are to be assembled into identity clusters and linked
with (imagined) collective functions: in effect, imagery about social ordering
and coordination. Second, they varied in imagery about how the collectivity is to
establish collective agency so as to mobilize resources in the pursuit of
collective goals.
1
Along the first dimension (“organization of society,” for short), some
polities, most often those with pronounced estate legacies, sustained corporate
models and practices of social organization over their politico-economic
consolidation during the nineteenth century. Others – those without or breaking
with an estate legacy – organized more around socially constructed public actors
and their associational efforts. One can contrast then two main models of the
organization of society: corporate and associational (a variant of the old
“community versus society” distinction).
2 In a philosophical idiom this
dimension represents the “ontological” dimension of social order: the co-
construction of social entities, relations, and collective functions.
Along the second dimension (“collective agency”), some polities – most
often those with strong theocratic or militarist legacies – sustained a statist
organization of authority, locating social charisma in a political center buffered
from society (Badie and Birnbaum 1983).
3 Others (most often those outside the
                                                          
1 This variation can be directly linked to the kinds of geomilitary, economic, and religious
forces charted in the macrohistorical literature. Some of the connections are already well
established: for instance, how lower exposure to military competition tends to generate less
state expansion and sometimes less of a state/society separation (see Tilly 1992; Collins
1986). This topic – how historical forces have generated the constitutive models and
structures under discussion – will be touched upon in the next section. But it cannot be
pursued properly in this paper.
2 The locus classicus is Toennies' distinction of Gemeinschaft vs. Gesellschaft (Toennies
[1887] 1957]. Toennies himself drew on earlier antinomies in social thought, notably Hegel's
distinction between a "family society" and a "civic society." Durkheim in turn employed the
contrast to distinguish "mechanical" vs. "organic" forms of solidarity. I draw more directly on
Max Weber's reworking of the antinomy to denote two primary types of solidary social
relationships, also called Vergemeinschaftung and Vergessellschaftung, translated by
Henderson and Parsons as "communal" and "associative" relations (Weber [1922] 1947:136-
157).
3 Joseph Nettl as far as I know coined the term "stateness" (Nettl 1968).RSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 9
Latin orbit, or on military peripheries) located charismatic authority more in
society itself, with government as an instrument of that society. One can then
contrast, within the modern Western system, two main forms of collective
agency: statist and societal. In a philosophical idiom this dimension represents
the “teleological” dimension of social order (the linking of the mundane world
and sacralized goals).
4
These two dimensions can be brought together in a typology, representing
four main models of modern nation-state polity: herein called liberal,
corporatist, state-corporatist, and state-nation. (See Figure 1.) To anticipate, the
"state-corporatist" form, as the label indicates, represents both a corporate
organization of society and a statist organization of collective agency. In sharp
contrast, the "liberal" model represents associational organization, and locates
sovereignty and capacity for collective action in society rather than in an
insulated collective center. The "state-nation" form shares the associational
organization of society, but features statist collective agency. The "social-
corporatist" model differs from the liberal form along the other dimension
(“organization of society”), sharing the societal location of collective agency,
but organizing society in a more corporate fashion. Needless to say, there are
other historical differentiae – one additional one will be introduced – but these,
given the nature of the European polity system, seem basic to how the different
polities were constituted. Accordingly the current paper focuses upon them.
Further, and strikingly, these historically predominant models of the
polity arguably capture well the actual institutional trajectories of the Anglo,
Nordic, Germanic and (to a lesser extent) Latin orbits. This association of
political orbits (and core countries) and distinct models of the polity is neither an
inevitable nor obvious outcome. In fact, recent historical sociology has
understandably become suspicious of attempts to map actual political units
directly onto institutional types. However, this is a matter to be resolved
substantively, rather than via metatheoretic commitments. The substantive
argument herein, empirical as well as theoretical, is that the particular historical
processes and conflicts of the European system, together with its cultural
framework, in fact both (a) generated a set of dominant polity models, and (b)
precipitated a historical mobilization of core countries around one or other of
these dominant models. The paper in its entirety provides the arguments and
evidence for these assertions.
                                                          
4 Note that common uses of "collectivism" (or distinctions of "individualism" and
"collectivism") tend to conflate the two dimensions of structuration that I purposefully
distinguish here. In some discussions "collectivism" may connote statist authority, in others a
more communal culture or social organization. It is useful to keep these uses distinct, as the
main typology of this paper will show.RSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 10
Figure 1
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Models of the Organization of Society (Relative "Corporateness")
The two models of social composition and coordination represent two main
routes away from medieval and early-modern society. In more corporate models,
society remains envisioned as a communal order, with subsidiary elements –
often collectivities themselves – carrying out explicitly imagined and
differentiated public roles or functions. In contrast, in more associational models
society is imagined more as a fellowship of members, initiating lines of public
action. In historical relief, this distinction contrasts the estate-based systems that
organized around modernized and democratized corporate relations (for
example, between guilds, occupations, classes, elites), from those systems
building around ideas of highly socialized and coordinated “actors.”
Both models of organization are religious in origin and form: one the one
hand, the sacralized order; on the other, the priesthood of all believers. Consider
Ernest Barker’s remark: "We have to distinguish the universitas, or corporate
unity, from the societas, or partnership, in which the members remain distinct, in
spite of their connection, and the unity is thus 'collective' rather than 'corporate'"
(quoted in Dumont 1986:73-74).
5 This distinction corresponds with a
fundamental historical differentiation between a society of Estates and a society
of individuals organized into classes or other associations (Anderson and
Anderson 1967:242-243). For instance, Catholic social doctrine was notoriously
a corporate theory, emphasizing "the role of vertically organized functional
groups – with control over their own internal structure" (Hammergren
1977:452). Over time the Continental European polities both developed new
individualized social structures and modernized in varying ways and degrees
their historic oligarchic and corporatist structures of guilds, independent cities,
churches, estates, and the like (Naumann 1984). Britain in contrast broke much
earlier with its estate tradition, and the U.S. polity, even more distinctly, was
individualist and anti-corporatist de novo.
6
The corporate systems organize around an explicit social control model:
in effect a system or functional theory of society. In a corporate system social
structure is reified. Society is a sacralized structure of roles, a communal order
constituted by differentiated collective functions. Collective solidarity is
expressed by a functional theory of roles, and corporate contexts are full of
ideology about roles and structures. Social organization is envisioned as rational
                                                          
5 Barker draws on Otto von Gierke's distinction between universitas (a corporate body or
corporation) and societas (a partnership), and his broader discussion of how "organic" ideas
were replaced by "collective" ideas of plurality, especially in legal doctrine. (See Gierke
[1881] 1958:89-90.)
6 I concentrate on the corporate form, as corrective to the Anglocentric social ontology built
into much contemporary social science.RSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 12
and planned, rather than natural and emergent as it is depicted in associational
imagery. Thus, the social structure itself is typically moralized: society is more a
rationalized union of subunits, rather than merely a facility for them (Swanson
1971a).
In corporate organization the subelements of society are pictured as
representing different socially-defined functions. The elements are typically
themselves groupings or orders, with group rights accorded to them. (They are
often "delegated polities" themselves [Crouch 1986:193].) For example, in Latin
America the Church, Army, and aristocracy have been central corporate
elements (Wiarda 1974; Stepan 1978). In Southern European corporatism,
society is a confederation of corporate elements: orders, guilds, communities,
leagues, military-religious orders (Wiarda 1982:25, drawing upon Eric Wolf). In
Northern European corporate organization, the corporate elements are economic
sectors and their elites, given functional interpretations (especially in
Scandinavia).
In associational systems, the other main form of coordination, society is
envisioned as a system of action generated by subunit "actors." Actors are
reified and sacralized; social structure arises from their communications and
exchanges (Baum 1977). Associational models are then ideologies about the
commitment and capacities of public actors (rather than about functions and
roles); these actors are primordial subunits of society. Social coordination is an
epiphenomenal outcome of their mutually-adjusting actions. Whereas collective
requirements and duties are stressed under corporate organization, rights and
choices are more prominent here.
7
                                                          
7 The Aston group of organizational analysts stressed the fundamental distinction between the
differentiation and authoritative control over persons, versus the differentiation and
coordination of activities.  Using this distinction one can characterize a range of different
organizing structures, extending from low structuration of both persons and activity, through
various intermediary mixes, to high structuration of both (Pugh 1976; Scott 1987). This
distinction applies to the organization of polities as well as formal organizations. In corporate
polities, where a structure of relations is reified and taken for granted as natural, people and
their identities are the objects of control efforts and the subjects of coordinating theories. In
associational systems, where (in contrast) entities rather than relations are reified and taken
for granted as natural – that is, individuals and various public actors – organizing efforts focus
upon the rationalization and coordination of activities. See Jepperson and Meyer 1991 for a
development of this dialectic and application to cross-national differences in formal
organizations.RSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 13
Models of Collective Agency (Relative "Statism”)
The second dimension of structuration, collective agency, distinguishes more
statist versus more societal organization of collective sovereignty and agency.
Statist systems locate collective purpose and authority in a differentiated and
insulated organizational center, that is in a unified state apparatus. In contrast,
more societal systems locate purpose and authority in society at large, with
government an instrument and expression of society.
The typology distinguishes two very different institutionalized political
models of collective agency, distinguishing visions of administration (and
“steering”) versus representation of society.
8 Variation in collective sovereignty
and agency reflects the differing legacies of theocratic, feudal, and revolutionary
models of rule, models that had imprinting effects on the political trajectories of
Western states (see for instance Dyson 1980:53). In France and Germany,
especially Germany, a strong centralized bureaucracy preceded the
establishment of parliamentary institutions. The subsequent traditions of the
German Beamtentum or French Fonction Publique have no Anglo counterpart
(Heper 1987:19). The Anglo tradition featured a "strong society and weak state,"
with a polity of "fused functions and divided powers" (Huntington 1968:Ch. 2).
9
The strength of both the British and American polities was located in a highly
rationalized civil society, rather than in an institutionally embodied “myth of the
state” (Cassirer 1966). 
These differences are revealed in distinctive legal traditions. Anglo
traditions of the "rule of law" are quite distinct from those of the Rechtstaat or
Etat de Droit; the latter two identify the rule of law with the state's authority,
while the former locates sovereignty in society (see Sartori 1962). In absolutist
traditions, law emanates from an Enlightened center, and the legal order confers
fixed duties and entitlements upon individuals, seen as liberating them from
personal dependencies (Unger 1976:186ff).
"Statist" models then feature imagery of central administration and
planning of society: what Dyson calls "integrated models of public power"
(Dyson 1980). The state represents and arrogates the public realm in these
                                                          
8 In this discussion I invoke an old distinction in the history of political thought. For example,
Jean Bodin long ago distinguished between the imagined location of sovereignty and the more
specific ways in which governmental authority is exercised. (For a discussion see D'Entreves
1967:100.) This old distinction is a reflection of a general principal/agency antinomy,
representing both the imagined ultimate locus of authority (sovereignty) and its delegated
agency structures. In application of this distinction to modern polity formation I draw heavily
upon work by Kenneth Dyson, especially Dyson 1980, and of course upon Nettl 1968.
9 I will need to qualify this standard characterization shortly (in part due to the intervention of
John Padgett, to whom I am grateful).RSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 14
systems, while society represents a private sphere subject to state tutelage. In
this model the state is envisioned as a sponsor of a higher moral order (Daalder
1983:3): it is a charismatic center representing the nation. The obvious religious
analogue is theocratic organization, and a liturgical entry of authority into
society. (Analysts have often represented the French state as a secular
replacement of the Catholic church.)
The state in this model is also the primary locus of social rationality. It is
represented as carrying a powerful universalizing and rationalizing intelligence;
an aura of "inspired officialdom" is present (Dovring 1978:149). Society is in
turn an arena of "particularity" and conflict of interests (Dyson 1980:228-230).
Politics must be grounded in an "objective" search for national interests;
individual activism is partisan and threatening (Dyson 1982). State officialdom
must govern individuals' or groups' access to the public arena.
"Societal" models of authority in contrast features imagery of politicking,
interest formation, representation, and bargaining. Authority lies in a "public,"
that is, in society. Society retains more collective agency, through its various
modalities of public action (interest groups, "public opinion," etc.). In this
model, government is more an instrument wielded by society, and thus has less
independent legitimation and standing. Access to the public sphere is less
restricted than under statist authority. There is less actual organizational
integration of administration, parliamentary, judicial, policing, executive, and
planning powers in a unified apparatus.
10
In Anglo societal traditions (Britain and its [former] colonies), images of
state and society are sharply separated, but both are independently valorized and
do not necessarily exist in opposition. Because much authority is left in society,
in a "public sphere" outside of the state apparatus, the state/society distinction
does not represent a public/private distinction as well as it does in the statist
systems. In Continental statist traditions, where the state is a "summation of
economic, social, cultural as well as political spheres" (Whitaker 1977:32),
society is less independently legitimated, and state and society often stand in
antagonistic relation. Because the state organizational system annexes the public
sphere, there is a starker divide between public and private domains.
11
It is crucial to underscore that strong polities should not be identified with
statist collective agency. Needless to say, Britain and the U.S. were powerfully
mobilized “strong” polities. The early centralization and powerful administrative
                                                          
10 Nettl notes that "statism" typically refers to the joining of government, bureaucracy, and
legislature into one collectivity (Nettl 1968:570).
11 Roman law, on which Continental legal traditions are based, provides for distinct public
and private law (res publica and res privatea) [Merryman 1969].RSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 15
development of England is well established in the historical literature (for
instance, Brewer 1989), and analysts from Tocqueville onward saw the strength
– collective organization and mobilization – of the U.S. polity (Bright 1984 for
review). But these systems did not, in comparative relief, develop and organize
around a myth of the state, and accordingly did not integrate and buffer
governmental functions to the same degree, or as sharply differentiate state and
society.
Among other things, this point means that statism should not be identified
with big government (or societal agency with small government). While statist
models and size of government (or government activity) are correlated, it is
important to keep them conceptually distinct. To repeat, the statist/societal
distinction codes the location of collective agency, not the size of the
governmental instrument. Thus, one can find "societal" agency conjoined with
expansive governmental activity (and one could find statist sovereignty with
relatively limited government activity
12). The import of sustaining this
distinction will become apparent in discussing the differences between the
Nordic and Germanic orbits, and in understanding post-WWII political change
in the Anglo systems (see below). Arguably these distinctions have not been
sufficiently established in the literature.
The Source of Collective Identity
The discussion has attended to the dimensions of models having to do with the
organization and purposive mobilization of society. Left out so far has been the
imagined nature and source of the “society” – the collective identity – that the
polity is mobilizing for.
In all the European systems this identity was pictured as some sort of
natural or spiritual “imagined community” (Anderson 1991), but the specific
constitutive features varied, in a systematic way. The Western tripartite ontology
established two socially-exogenous sources of identities, by picturing the social
domain as suspended between spiritual and natural domains and hence
organizing both natural and spiritual inputs (Eisenstadt 1987; Meyer and
Jepperson 2000). Recognizing this ontology helps to contextualize the literature
on collective identities (and viz. nationalism). This literature describes two main
elements in construction of European collective identities: imagined natural
connections (specifically, kinship-based, ethnolinguistic ties), and imagined
spiritualized connections (specifically, political and ideological commitments)
[Smith 1991; Brubaker 1992]. Both elements are present in all the modern
polities, but the specific articulation varies in important ways.
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Rogers Brubaker has suggested a useful distinction between what is
constitutive versus expressive of a collective identity (Brubaker 1990:386). He
contrasts the historical legacies of Germany and France in these terms. In
comparative relief the German collective identity was imagined somewhat more
in “naturalized” terms of kinship: these ties constitute the nation, while political
forms were ideally to reflect authentic descent. In contrast, the French nation
was constituted more by political (“spiritualized”) imagery. To be French was to
be (in effect) spiritually French: for example, those who were educated in
French political culture could be members of the French nation independent of
ethnicity or descent (Brubaker 1990:389; Dumont 1986:130-131 for a similar
argument).
13 Like that of France, U.S. nationhood is constituted by “creedal”
definitions (Hartz 1964; Bell 1990). Americans also claimed to embody the
fulfillment of a utopian project with universal validity, but in this case one
directly legitimated by religious ideas.
14 In further contrast, Britain has been
characterized as having a pre-modern collective identity, with nationality
grounded in myths of dynastic continuity and in the associated imperial project
(Nairn 1977; Brubaker 1990:399).
This dimension of models of the polity – the imagined primordial core of
collective identity – is analytically separable from the previously discussed
institutional dimensions, and itself has substantial causal import. For instance,
Brubaker as well as Pierre Birnbaum (and his colleagues) have invoked models
of identity as shaping immigration regimes and as structuring citizenship and
immigration politics.
Further, the imagined core of collective identity can be sacralized to
varying degrees, becoming the locus symbolization, identification, and
“invented tradition” (Hobsbawm 1983). The extent of such reification and
sacralization obviously varies: both over polities (for example, religious polities
claiming direct godly preferential status) and over time (for example, the
imperial visions of the era of high nationalism versus the tamed nationalisms of
contemporary Europe). These variations will also be considered in the
discussion of contemporary institutional change. The first task, however, is to
apply the basic distinctions that have been advanced.
                                                          
13 It is easy to exaggerate and reify this distinction, and Brubaker and others have been
criticized for doing so. For example, John Hutchinson usefully reminds that “…’ethnic’ and
‘civic’ are ideal-typical categories, and all nations draw on aspects of both. … They denote
different modes of identification…that wax and wane in relation to each other due to specific
factors. In the late nineteenth century the influx of large-scale immigration of Jews from
Russian and eastern European provoked strong ethnocentric reactions in civic France… .”
And this civicness was “built upon older assumptions about a Gallic France which was the
heir to Rome and also the chosen daughter of the universal Church” (Hutchinson 2000:12, 4).
14 O.W. Holmes: “It is our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one.”RSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 17
FOUR PREDOMINANT POLITY MODELS
This section turns to the predominant polity models, showing the utility of
describing different national polities as institutionalizing in different ways – and
to different degrees – four basic models of social organization and collective
agency. In discussing each of the dominant polity models, I concentrate on a
political system (or systems) that most clearly organized around the model under
discussion – for example, Germany for the “state-corporatist” model. I highlight
main characteristics drawn from an extensive literature on national histories of
political and social organization. I then discuss a number of countries that
represent less canonical or more unique cases.
The State-corporatist Model
Wilhelmine Germany is the classic example of a state-corporatist model. Other
Germanic polities also represent this model (as does Japan to some extent [see
next section]).
15
Germany has both a strongly corporate and statist heritage. Society itself
was historically envisioned as a hierarchic communal order, institutionalizing
substantive (as well as procedural) rules for proper public authority. One still
finds legacies of both an authoritarian (Prussian) state tradition, and medieval
corporate doctrine: doctrines of society as a properly functioning organism
(Baum 1968).
16
German statism was revealed in the historical absence of a German
equivalent to "government" in its broad sense (Johnson 1978:180). The state
referred to both the institutions of government and the organized political
community as a whole: a shorthand for the rules and norms by which the
community attains coherence (ibid. p. 181). In this tradition, a centralized
bureaucracy mediates between state and society; the Beamte in self-conception
are representatives of the nation (see the review in Rosenhaft and Lee 1990).
German higher civil servants were traditionally an estate of state servants,
                                                          
15 I reify the "Germanic tradition" here to some extent. For example, I stress the Prussian
heritage; Southern German traditions were less collectivist (Baum 1968).
16 The language of public proclamations is often quite revealing of underlying models of the
polity. For example, a common Prussian colloquialism called for individuals to "do one's
damn duty and obligation" (Baum 1968). University students in 1949 were encouraged to
"learn their duty within the social body"; "public order is the citizen's first duty." Carlo
Schmid when Vice President of the Bundestage was quoted as saying that "German youth
needs to be educated to disobedience" (Phillips 1989:2). In West Berlin into the 1980s one
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wearing uniforms reflecting their status.
17 "As in no other country, higher
officials in every German state personified intelligence and culture and became
bearers of political development" (Anderson and Anderson 1967:389). Otto
Hintze classically argued that the underlying model of the Prussian state stressed
loyalty and devotion in return for patriarchal care. This tutelary imagery was
assimilated into business organization and management as well. 
Correspondingly, in this tradition notions of "civil society" were "neither
linguistically nor culturally grounded" (Bendix 1990-1991:149). By the end of
the nineteenth century, sovereignty belonged to the state as such, not to the
people or to a particular organ or even the monarch (ibid.). Individual rights
developed in connection with the consolidation of a strong state, rather than
being won in opposition to state power (Braunthal 1989:309). A prominent
historian has remarked that German discourse employed a similar language of
rights as the rest of the West, but differed substantially in the content of such
discussion, envisioning the state as elevating the individual into a realm of
freedom (Krieger 1957:8).
18 Weimar theorists discussed how one might
synthesize the individual liberties of Western tradition with the "social liberty"
of Eastern collectivism (ibid. pp. 464-465). German liberals were not supportive
of popular assemblies and did not push for ministerial responsibility to
parliament (Rosenhaft and Lee 1990).
The long dominance of Hegelian thinking about the state was related to
“the entirely private notion of society in Germany" (Grimm 1985:100). State-
corporatism generates a distaste for an interest politics: society should occupy a
higher stage where government reflects a normatively proper general will and a
more "objective" system of policy-making (Schram 1971; Scheuch 1988:90).
State-sponsored “peak” associations were constructed to facilitate economic and
political ordering (Anheier 1991); ideas of individual voluntarism, outside of
state-led channels, were little established. The idea of the state as existing above
democratic politics has been an enduring one (Dyson 1975). Over time group
pluralism gained more acceptance, but until very recently there has been a
powerful ambivalence toward the interest group bargaining characteristic of the
liberal systems (Scheuch 1988:89ff). Ideas of the common good have remained
substantive ones: ideals of a solidary integration of society and substantive
                                                          
17 Late nineteenth century Prussia provided over 100 different classes of decorations to
bestow to public officials (Anderson and Anderson 1967:230).
18 Ernst Troeltsch's discussion of "organic liberty," even if exaggerated, is instructive here.
"Liberty is not equality but service by the individual at his place in the function
(Orgunstellung) allotted to him" (though the individual may then "freely exercise his
criticism"). German liberty is "a secularization of the religious sense of duty and, in particular,
its intensification into an activity of creation in common" (Troeltsch quoted in Dumont
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justice, rather than open-ended process-based ones (Rueschemeyer 1973:90-91).
In this vision, politics should be grounded in an objective search for national
communal interests; individual activism is partisan and threatening, and
disagreement on public matters traditionally carried moral opprobrium (Dyson
1982; Lewin 1948). One attains the collective good by finding technically
correct solutions (Dyson 1982).
The corporate model of German society is revealed in interest
organization and representation: historically, interests attained constitutional
representation if they fit into a desired pattern (Hirsch-Weber 1958:273). For
example, in the Wilhelmine period, social classes – although not the working
class – were given direct representation in the state apparatus (Mann 1987). The
Bonn Republic sustained a "corporatist rather than individual-liberal approach to
organizing social groups" (Crouch 1978; Unger 1976:218-219). Various
corporate status groups have persisted, some deriving explicit rights from the
state, and mediating between state and society in sectoral areas (Dyson 1982;
Crouch 1980). For example, until very recently judges and civil servants were
organized in a manner akin to guilds, and depicted in law and public discourse
in this fashion (Schram 1971). Similarly, the German business elite at least
through the 1950s conceived of itself as a Funktionselite, a functional extension
of  Stand notions (Hartmann 1959:265).
19 Historically unions have been
accorded rights by the state and have shared responsibility for industrial
governance; social welfare activities have been explicitly delegated to churches.
A corporate aura still surrounds occupational structures (for example, in the
extensive use of apprenticeship training, or the continuing neo-patrimonial
organization of German academe).
Changes. During the Bonn Republic, Germany underwent a
reconstruction of the corporate subelements of society: society remained a
national community and corporate order, but the subelements themselves
became less corporate. Also, models of authority have democratized; the 1960s
in particular reflected a substantial weakening of statist ideology.
20 The political
parties became more independent and important institutions, rather than just
having a delegated role in the state (for a review see Smith 1989). Neoliberal
ideas were conjoined with Rechtstaat ideas in notions of the "public service
state" (Dyson 1977). Large areas of administration have been turned into quasi-
judicial processes (Dyson 1982), federalist and "subsidiarity" principles have
further weakened centralist emphases, as has the related spread of administrative
                                                          
19 In this model, individuals in an organization constituted a community, with managers
responsible for the personnel, and the latter in a state of dependency.
20 One symbolization: in the Bundeshaus, the government bench was originally on a dais
several feet about the floor; ministers literally looked down on parliamentarians. It was moved
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responsibilities over a wide range of para-state bodies (Katzenstein 1987).
Kenneth Dyson (1977) discusses dramatic alterations in bureaucrats' role
conceptions.
However, the state still remains a moral and tutelary agency, and models
of society as an organic unity persist. For example, the Constitutional Court
continues to make pronouncements on the proper social functions of the family,
with the suggestion of access to a natural law (see Scheuch 1988). The parties
remain to some extent Staatorgane, having some delegated constitutional and
moral functions (Smith 1979:67; Heper 1987:18). There has nevertheless been
some convergence with both the liberal and social-corporatist systems.
The Liberal Model
The U.S. is the purest example of a liberal model. Britain and the other Anglo
systems are also instances, as is to some degree Australia (see next section).
The liberal systems, featuring associational organization and societal
agency, variously sacralize society and the individuals and associations that are
envisioned as constituting it. The U.S. was "capitalist de novo" (C.W. Mills’
phrase), without either a feudal (estate) or absolutist tradition. It represents the
"first new nation" (Lipset 1963) most exclusively organizing around “civil
society" (Bell 1990:48). In its composition, it is a "universalist national
collectivity” (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985), alike a spiritual fellowship of
common believers rather than a unified corporate order as in the state-corporatist
polity. Political community is sacralized directly via "civil religion" doctrines,
rather than indirectly via a Church or State (Bellah and Hammond 1980).
The U.S. especially shows a weak mythic elaboration of an authoritative
center: government was originally a "state of courts and parties" (Skowronek
1981). In this vision, popular sovereignty is expressed through debate in a
common public, rather than through functional representation of corporate
estates. There is an associated great reification of public opinion. James Bryce
spoke of "government by public opinion" in the U.S.: "in no country is opinion
so powerful as in the U.S.: in no country can it be so well studied" (Bryce
1923:251). Individualist religious or quasi-religious solutions are sought for
most problems (Susman 1984:80ff); a "logic of community building" and
voluntarism obtains whereby community is built by individuals taking action
(Varenne 1984).
21 Society is represented as a congeries of identities and interests
allowing one to form such groups; such identity and interest differentiation is
thought to be natural and is highly legitimated. For instance, in American
                                                          
21 This imagery remains conspicuous in contemporary American-suffused
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tradition people can be proud of their “ethnicity” rather than feeling civically
disabled by it – in strong contrast with the French (statist) logic of the
“indivisible republic.”
Britain had early experienced a transformation of corporate estate
structures into a class-based system, through revolution and commercialization.
Parliament, for example, was much less an assembly of estates here than
elsewhere. In Britain society is conceived in more "organic" terms than in the
U.S. (Beer 1956:22): social groupings are more organized and articulated within
a status order capped by an integrating social establishment. But comparison
with systems other than the U.S. places Britain firmly in the associational camp,
at least for purposes of first-cut clustering.
Regarding collective agency, "it was society which, until recently at least,
absorbed the state" in Britain (Johnson 1978:182). The Crown, for example,
symbolizes a hierarchy of society, not an independent state: an embodiment of
society – an "Establishment" – runs the state.
22 Joseph Schumpeter classically
argued that a status order dominated economic and political orders (Bell
1990:48). There is no notion of an integrated governmental hierarchy making up
a state (Dyson 1980:271). British governmental traditions stress devolution of
public authority into society, and distaste for officialdom and bureaucracy (see
Thomson 1940:83-86 for a classic treatment). Government "operates on the
same plane as other political actors" (Hayward 1976): in liberal ideology and
jurisprudence, in a dispute government is merely another party – a very different
imagery than that obtaining in the truly statist systems.
In England, and then in the U.S. even more prominently, public and
private spheres were closely intertwined, while in governance, legal, political,
and administrative forms of control were distinguished and separately
institutionalized. The U.S. shows a remarkable interpenetration of public and
private spheres, with government modulating the mix. It becomes difficult to
describe the profile of political intervention into (versus buffering of) social
domains, since civil society is so public in authority and functions (with
extensive social authority left with business and professional elites in society,
for instance), and government so colonized by social forces.
It is instructive to note that European continental politico-theoretic
traditions largely identify sovereignty with legitimacy, while the Anglo-Saxon
tradition of organization sharply distinguishes the two concepts (Hennis n.d.).
Wilhelm Hennis has pointed out that Anglo-Saxon commentary pays prominent
attention to the problem of citizen "obedience," concerning citizen determination
                                                          
22 In Stanley Rothman’s terms, the Crown represents the British community qua community
in its total historical development (Rothman 1970 :494).RSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 22
of whether the sovereign is operating in a legitimate manner. This focus is
absent in Continental and Germanic tradition; obedience in these discourses is a
superfluous rather than a focal concept.
Changes. In the liberal systems state activity and resources expanded
greatly with British imperial efforts and then again with the world wars
(especially since WWII; see Jessop 1980 for a discussion). But the state remains
a political manifestation of society. Power is diffused through the proliferation
of independent centers of decision (Dyson 1980:67). Policy making has
remained reactive compared to Germany or Sweden (Jordan and Richardson
1982). Labor party ideology has been etatiste, but its practice has been
voluntarist (Birnbaum 1982). English governance reveals a "virtually
nonexistent planning structure" (ibid.), without an institutionalized bureaucracy
of the Continental sort; it is more a "policy community" centered around
Parliament and the government's ministers (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974).
However, according to specialists such as Samuel Beer and Keith Middlemas,
Britain has become markedly more "collectivist" in the post-War period – in the
terms here, more statist. So Britain moves somewhat toward the state-nation
systems (not yet described), but it should still be seen as a "liberal"
representative, when placed in comparative relief. Expanded government
activity, and even an elaborated welfare state, need not indicate a move from
societal to statist collective agency. Indeed the "contradictions of collectivism"
discussed by Beer (Beer 1982) are best understood as flowing from the
dilemmas of an expanded government facing a liberal society.
The U.S. like Britain has experienced an expanded government. But it
still squarely represents the liberal cell. (As will be discussed, over time all the
systems reveal expanded government activity, so the baseline for comparison
changes.) Having said this, one can detect some reduction in traditional reliance
on the self-governance of "civil society," and some "corporatization" of the
makeup of American society – viz. the transformation of interest and ethnic
groups into proto-corporate subcommunities. These should be seen as nascent
institutional shifts, of causal consequence.
The State-nation Model
23
France generated and is the archetypal representative of this form.
24 Far more
weakly representative are other Latin systems: for example, Italy, Belgium, and
Spain (to be discussed in the next section).
                                                          
23 Others have referred to a “Jacobin” polity.
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The state-nation model is associational rather than corporate in its
rationalization of society, but statist in the way it locates collective agency. In
France, revolutionary and Napoleonic regimes aggressively reorganized the
polity around a central state apparatus and a plebiscitary public: Jacobin
ideology and practice was explicitly anti-corporatist (an attack on the
Staendestaat [Poggi 1978]). Jacobin perceptions still linger in collective
representations of society as composed of centrifugal forces threatening the
integrity of the state (Hayward 1982). Interest groups are condemned – and legal
tradition restricted the development of them – but society organizes around them
anyway, without celebrating voluntarism as does the liberal system.
25 In French
models people are human beings and citizens first; group identities – for
instance, religious ones or ethnic ones – must be sequestered from the public
sphere, rather than allowed to constitute it.
In organizing ideals of authority, popular sovereignty is unmediated, and
"the Renaissance antithesis of sovereign individual and sovereign state has
persisted in sharper terms than in England" (Thomson 1964:126). But it is the
Nation that rules, not the people: deputies represent the will of the nation, not
segmental citizen voices (Sartori 1962; LaPalombara 1969:178ff; Unger
1976:163-164). Ideas of a fully popular sovereignty were quickly marginalized
in post-revolutionary imagery. Scholars can even claim that, until very recently,
"French political science has [had] little acquaintance with the notion of
citizenship" (Leca 1990:144), or that, in typical French administrative ideology,
“consultation takes place so that the administration can explain its decisions to
the groups affected by them” (Suleiman 1974:333). The state in French political
cosmology became a transformative center, the primary representative of the
nation. State officials were bearers of a "transcendental rationalism" (Birnbaum
1988:74); educators referred, for example, to the importance of "learning the
milieu of the 'senior executives' of the Nation..." (Marceau 1977:229). This
imagery helps to explain the periodic legitimation of ideas of popular
dictatorship: governance by one man, but democratic in source (see Bryce's
early discussion [Bryce 1921:vol. 1 p. 291]).
Society in this system is not independently legitimated and is associated
with protest, schism, and irresponsibility (as in the much debated relatively
                                                          
25 "Although the concrete historical effort of Frenchmen has consisted for centuries in
demanding from the state the liberty to constitute in actual fact 'partial societies,' this has
remained for French democratic tradition within the category of the sein; it has not reached
the level of political theory, the sollen... Hence there is widespread consensus to condemn
interest groups morally, or more exactly, to condemn their unwarranted interferences in
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recent images of the "delinquent society").
26 It is said to lack a consensual basis
(Faucheux, Amado, and Laurent 1982:353). The public has traditionally been
represented as a manipulable mass rather than an informed body (Hayward
1982:125). In a Rousseauist variant, the general will emerges if citizens are
unable to communicate (Bendix 1990-91). Demands for participation have until
recently been interpreted as interference (Bourricaud 1958). "Allegiances to
peripheral structures of territory or of class have remained strong, and have
clashed incessantly with a state which claims to incarnate legitimacy"
(Birnbaum 1990:249-250). This system generates a classic dualism, an
oscillation between authoritarian rule and periodic revolt: a pattern first analyzed
by Tocqueville (Tocqueville [1856] 1955:210-211) and then noted for each
subsequent political regime through the present.
27
The state-nation polity is mirrored in the stratification structure of society.
Laurence Wylie and many others have remarked upon the hierarchical structure
of French society, with its caste-like elements: in Wylie’s characterization, each
group "barricades itself behind its 'acquired rights' and resists all movements for
change" (Wylie 1957). Occupations are legally codified in a manner not true of
the U.S. or Britain (Marwick 1986:24). Titles and status are dignified; formality
is tied to authority or function (for example being a boss), rather than based in
social background as in England (ibid. p. 355; Crozier 1964).
Changes. The long history of state/society tension has persisted in France,
with the state struggling to manage a fractious array of insulated castes and
classes. State institutions continue to limit participation and representation,
redirecting popular forces into protest efforts. Political regimes continue to
struggle with varying allocations of executive, representative, and plebiscitary
powers.
In the 1970s and '80s, however, there have been indications of a "gradual
abandonment of the traditional Jacobin approach to defining French politics and
society" (Safran 1985:270; Schmidt 1996), with distantly parallel developments
in Italy. Anti-etatisme has become more fashionable. Governments in both
France and Italy have pursued devolution with some seriousness (perhaps
especially the French Socialist government of 1981-86) [Schmidt 1996]; the
partial decontrol of the broadcast media in these systems is perhaps an even
more serious indicator of institutional change. There has been a great expansion
                                                          
26 A representative quotation, from Pompidou in 1969: "History has demonstrated that our
people, who by nature are given to division and the most extreme individualism, has only
been molded into the French nation by means of the state" (quoted in Tarle 1979:44).
27 See Siegfried 1956 on "stable instability," Stanley Hoffman on France's "limited
authoritarianism" and "potential insurrection against authority" (Hoffman 1963), and also
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of voluntary associations, consumer groups, and citizen lobbies, as well as
heightened grass roots militancy; efforts that both indicate and foster a slow
modification of the traditional centralism characterizing these systems.
28
The Social-corporatist Model
The Nordic countries best represent this polity form. Like the state-corporatist
systems, the social-corporatist polity also organizes the collectivity as a
communal order. But while this polity employs extensive governmental activity,
the state has historically been envisioned more as a natural extension of a
governing societal community. Crucially, unlike the Germanic legacy one does
not find the same centralist arrogation of collective agency or the equivalent
state/society divide. Government rather intermediates the organized interests of
society (Olsen 1983).
In this connection, many social scientists refer to the Nordic model as a
"guardian society" or "welfare society." In this vision, society is an integrated
partnership, a "national social community" organized around a "comprehensive
system of community norms" (Heclo and Madsen 1987:27; Anton 1980:177).
For example, the Swedish Social Democrats in the 1930s used the image of
creating a "people's home" (folkhemmet) through welfare state programs (March
and Olsen 1989). Humanitarian welfarist ideology dominates, especially in
Sweden and Norway (Allardt 1984).
The social-corporatist polity is a rationalized functional community rather
than a hierarchic order. Status is accorded narrowly to functional roles, with
limited deference to hierarchy; deference is to specific functional competence
(Eckstein 1966 on Norway). A clear hierarchy of functional estates is absent.
Titles are functional rather than status-based; there is a conspicuous lack of
honorific titles, social registers, and so forth. Both invidious comparisons
between people, and the idea of charismatic personal leadership, are shunned
(Torgersen 1974:207-225).
People enter the public sphere not as independent actors carrying private
"interests," but as functionally-specific role players carrying delimited
competencies, intensively mobilized into a multitude of formal organizations.
Ideology and education systems emphasize proper acting out of the details of
roles (see Eckstein 1966 on Norway). Interests and policy-making are organized
around functional sectors, representing dense corporate organizational blocs:
agriculture, labor relations, capital (see for example Anton 1969; Ruin 1982;
Olsen, Roness and Saetren 1982; Kvavik 1976). In Norway, customary practice
                                                          
28 In this characterization of changes I draw in addition upon Safran 1985, Kesselman 1987,
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prescribed the self-governance of functional areas by the people comprising the
area (Kvavik 1976:159). Top groups form an establishment of association
members (Elvander 1974:35). These polities are full of interest groups – here
often called "popular movements" – labor groups, religious organizations,
consumers associations, cooperative societies, temperance groups, adult
education societies (Ortmark 1979), producing the highest organizational
density in the world. Traditionally such groups had constitutions and were alike
guilds in structure and operation (von Otter 1980:152).
All legitimated groups are to some extent integrated into public authority.
Participatory rights are accorded to representatives of specific interests (Olsen
1983:166ff). Elective-representational channels operate within a frame set by the
bargaining of corporate groups, distinguishing this system from the liberal polity
(Rokkan 1968). In this model, democracy is achieved through corporate
bargaining as much as through plebiscitary means; under such arrangements,
unlike in the liberal system, expanded organizational participation is thought to
foster democracy.
An ideology of community consensus frames policy-making. While
"voice" is encouraged – for example, in Sweden papers are subsidized to speak
from different political viewpoints in order to sustain a political dialogue
(Hollstein 1983) – this is not a "pluralist" system. The emphasis is on
incorporating voices into a harmonious community discussion. True opposition
is dangerous. Analysts note the discouragement of overtly ideological
discussions. Elites strive to convert political issues into technical problems:
Heisler and Kvavik (1974:74) speak usefully of the "cooptive polity."
While state activity in Scandinavia is obviously (even notoriously)
extensive, state and society are highly interpenetrated, and there is little
institutionalized state-society opposition (and low salience of public/private
distinctions) [Allardt 1984:172, Hernes 1988, Zetterberg 1984, Eckstein 1966].
"The absence of clearly defined institutional boundaries [between public and
private] are among the hallmarks of Scandinavian historical development"
(Hernes 1988:208).
29 This “absence” demarcates societal-type authority and thus
is shared with the liberal systems. In the social-corporatist form, it in part
follows from a model of the state as a "movement" or project fostering national
progress. In Sweden, for example, the Social Democratic Party for many years
was the carrier of the nation's transformative social project (Heclo and Madsen
1987:27,44). State structures are envisioned as coordinating and administering,
rather than directing: authority models feature emphasis on rule-based
                                                          
29 "In Swedish and Norwegian public discourse the words 'society' and 'state' are used
interchangeably, and not as dichotomies as in other languages" (Hernes 1988:214-215; also
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coordination, rather than imperative authority. The role of central agencies is to
facilitate and motivate the formulation of commitment and understanding, rather
than to control (March and Olsen 1989): the implicit model is a collegium of
governance of functional groups and sectors (Anton 1980:Ch. 4; Olsen, Roness
and Saetren 1982:61). This imagery helps to explain why Joseph Nettl went so
far as to describe the Nordic system as reflecting an "absence of state," when
viewed comparatively (Nettl 1968).
Associated with this communal authority is an "absence of inherent
distrust" between public and authorities (Zetterberg 1984:87) and a traditional
image of the government as a benefactor rather than oppressor (Allardt
1984:181-182) – at least until very recently. There is "an extremely relaxed
attitude of people toward their central government and public authorities. We do
not, in fact, have many feelings toward the state at all..." (Andersen 1984:118).
An aggressive "publicity principle" mandates extensive openness in government
operations. This openness cuts the opposite way as well: in such a system, it is
hard to escape the public. A writer for an underground paper in Stockholm
complained that it is hard to remain underground: if the government finds you,
they give you a subsidy (Richardson 1982).
Changes. The Nordic polities too have reconstructed their corporate
subelements, individualizing them while sustaining organization around the
nation as a community. Increasingly the subelements of society are more like
liberal individuals, but ones who happen to be intensively organized within a
matrix of formal organizations – which itself still has a corporate character.
30
Thus along this dimension one finds some convergence of the liberal and social-
corporatist systems. In addition, in recent years the legacy of the expanded
welfare state has stimulated an uncharacteristic state/society opposition in
Sweden and Denmark. (See Gress 1988 for a review of statist tendencies and
reactions against.) Thus, the social-corporate and state-corporate systems have
to some degree begun to converge as well.
Other Countries, Relative to the Predominant Polity Models
The core allegation so far has been that a number of core polities within the
European states system developed around distinct polity models. Now it is
appropriate to discuss a number of additional countries relative to the typology,
countries that represent less canonical or more unique forms – for reasons that
can be theorized. I intend this discussion to provide additional application of the
typology, and further contextualization of it.
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A number of polities in the modern states system did not form as clearly
around one of the dominant models of the polity, for one or more of the
following reasons :
* because for historical reasons they developed a mixed historical-
institutional heritage;
* because they represent historical organization around a distinctive polity
model;
* because they are not constructed national projects to the same degree,
and hence represent a distinctive type of polity;
* or because they were late entrants into the European modernity project,
and hence for an extended period not much rationalized by a modernist
polity model.
Exemplifying these paths in turn (with no attempt to be synoptic in countries
considered):
(1) Mixed-model systems: Canada is an example of a colloidal polity: it
mixes French and British constitutional doctrines and political cultures. Hence it
can be thought of as a hybrid of liberal and state-nation elements, with New
World federalism admixed as well. For instance: an explicitly dual legal system
is maintained, with the presence of French civil law in Quebec (Ehrmann
1976:14-15). Canada historically has been a coalition of subunits – provinces,
socioreligious and linguistic groupings, institutional elites (Westhues 1977).
This heritage enables one analyst to see Canada as on the way to becoming the
first "post-modern nation-state": "a weak center acting as a kind of holding
company" (The Economist 1991:18).
(2) Distinctive models: Australia, while in general terms a liberal form, is
in many respects a unique configuration linked to its particular colonial
trajectory; an example of statist liberalism. A strong reliance on government
regulation and initiative is combined with contemptuous attitudes toward
authority (Taft and Walker 1958). (Louis Hartz called Australia a "radical
democracy" [Hartz 1964].) Organization and expression of interests is
"Benthamite"; unabashed and economistic (Collins 1985, Bryce 1921). But
liberal interests organize to invoke strong government intervention and
regulation.
This uniqueness may be due to a configurational combination of founding
populism, early colonial politicization of class relations, and simultaneous early
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assemblage can itself have causal effects of note, independent from any effects
attributed to a “liberal model” and shared with other liberal systems.
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Japan entered the European world system as a distinctive state-corporatist
form, with little construction of individualism, and no notions of popular
sovereignty.
32 The Meiji restoration borrowed largely from Prussian organizing
models. The development of a distinctive form of popular sovereignty elements,
and the reordering of society's corporate structures, were both post-WWII
developments. Given its heritage, Japan remains the most state-corporatist of the
rich democratic polities. One analyst says Japan could be called a "feudal
democracy" due to the importance of occupational groupings having quasi-
familial loyalties and obligations (Beer 1981:440). Society remains a minutely
graded hierarchy of corporate bodies with powerful outsider/insider divides.
Social organization employs a "metalanguage of group" (Eisenstadt 1996), and
given the "assertive groupism" (Beer 1981:442) one does not find a common,
integrated, public sphere in the Western sense. The bureaucracy is the central
institution of the polity, coordinating semi-autonomous elites sharing power
(van Wolferen 1989). Public opinion (in the Western sense) and law have not
been strong independent forces until recently. While ideas of a governmental
obligation to be responsive to social needs are well established, a clear-cut
political theory of rights in the Western sense has not been present.
(3) Less integrated national communities: The so-called “consociational”
systems are multinational polities with correspondingly distinctive polity
models. For instance, Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum argue that
Switzerland does not have a consolidated political "center" due to its cantonal
federalism (Badie and Birnbaum 1983). It reflects both liberal and social-
corporatist elements, sharing with the liberal systems little legitimation of
bureaucracy and officialdom, but with social-corporatist imagery of public duty
and corporatist decision-making practice (Katzenstein 1985). (For example, its
1874 Constitution was modeled on that of the U.S., but without any equivalent
to the Bill of Rights.)
Netherlands, the canonical consociational polity, evolved from a liberal-
commercial regime. The governing model is that of a patriciate, acting as the
superordinate trustee for the people – a "Regent mentality" (van Mierlo 1986;
                                                          
31 This form of configurational argument is less emphasized in this paper, given its
simplifying and generalizing thrust. But it is entirely compatible with the main line of
argumentation featured.
32 Both Robert Bellah and Shmuel Eisenstadt have argued that Japan should be seen as a fully
distinct civilization, incorporating European techniques of governance while resisting the
underlying universalistic ideas of morality and social authority (Eisenstadt 1996; Bellah
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Goudsblom 1967:16). The various religious-based zuilen are corporatized within
the broader polity, but individuals appear to be the main units and actors within
them. Later evolution incorporated elements of Scandinavian welfare society
development, and, starting in the 1960s, a partial deconstruction of the
verzuilung system and a corresponding reconstruction of consociational practice
(Bax 1990). To the extent the typology of this paper provides illumination of
this distinctive polity, Netherlands should probably be seen as another hybrid of
liberal and social-corporatist elements.
Belgium historically combines statist and corporatist elements in a
federalized multinational polity. A 1972 Kultuurpakt regulated corporatist
allocation of civil service jobs, money, and cultural decision-making between
the three major pillars (Catholic, Socialist, and liberal-conservative). In this
context, "[p]eople are less citizens than clients" of the polity (Huyse 1984:155).
Constitutional amendments in the 1970s and 1980s greatly reduced the unitary
character of the polity, and reinforced the Flemish/Walloon cultural
differentiation – and so has current European economic and political integration,
with its “Europe of regions.”
Austria even more than Germany is a state-corporatist regime, but until
very recently a formal political democracy without a public sphere strongly
established for debate and conflict. (Austria has been labeled as "DemoStalinist"
by one Austrian journalist, Guenther Neuning.) It is in some respects an
"artificial republic" (Wheatcroft 1988): until recently a strong intellectual
current maintained that the "nation" was an inappropriate or irrelevant concept
for Austria (see Bluhm 1973:Ch. 5). In the mid-1960s for instance only one third
of the citizens saw Austria as both politically and culturally distinct (Katzenstein
1977).
(4)  Less- or late-rationalized polities: A number of polities were late
entrants into the modernist nation-state polity project, and hence are not well
described by the main modernist polity models. For instance, the Iberian
systems (Spain,  Portugal) historically were imperial projects, their more
traditional authoritarian corporatist forms sustained by colonial wealth until the
recent period (Schmitter 1974; Stepan 1978). To some degree one might
characterize them as a hybrid of state-nation and state-corporatist forms, due to
the reliance upon state-licensed organizational intermediaries (Williamson 1985)
as well as upon traditional social orders such as the church and army. With late
decolonization and recent democratic consolidation has come institutional
transformation – almost a leap from early-modern to late-modern polity forms,
the latter referring in this case to experiments with devolution and linkages to
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Italy presents a parallel instance. In its historical development Italy
developed some elements of a “state-nation” model as a normative ideal. But in
this case society colonized a weak state apparatus. The state has been an
"archipelago" of loosely connected institutions, akin to a feudal structure of
centers of power and influence (Donolo 1980:165, 172): an “oligarchic
democracy” until the transformations initiated in the 1960s and expanding in the
1980s (LaPalombara 1987). For example, during the 1960s, "Italian unions came
to realize that the government was not the center of political power, or rather,
that political power did not have a center, but was diffused throughout political
and civil society” (Sassoon 1986:129). This pattern was emblematized by the
mass media, often an instructive indicator of polity models. Until very recently,
"Italian TV news [was] essentially a utility maintained by the parties to inform
the public about their views and activities"; the television journalist was a party
functionary (Hallin and Mancini 1985:58). Media instruments were partitioned
out to the different parties, until the explosion of media outlets in the 1980s
(Cavazza 1979; Sassoon 1986:157-158).
CHANGES IN POLITY MODELS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA
The previous section discussed some contemporary institutional changes
specific to each of the polity models. This section presents a more general
picture of changes in the organizing models over during the post-WWII era,
using the framework advanced so far as a device for systematizing existing
observations in the literature, and for generating additional ones.
To anticipate, one can detect some convergence in basic institutional
logics over this period: both a lessening of the distances between corporate and
associational social organization, and also between statist and societal agency.
Specifically, (a) all the polity forms have moved in a liberal direction, but with
expanded government activity (at least until the post-Cold War period, to be
discussed). Also, (b) traditional corporate organization has been transformed; at
the same time, in the liberal systems one finds a partial corporatizing of the
traditionally associational interest groups and subcultures. Separately, (c)
nations have begun to lose some ontological standing as identities; relatedly,
states have begun to lose political charisma, becoming themselves more
mundane and rationalized vehicles as opposed to more sacralized projects.
The historical context of these shifts is of course the post-war spread of
liberal models throughout the world system, due to the post-WWII settlement
and reconstruction. These models have been propagated via an unprecedented
world-level cultural and organizational development: an emergent “world
polity” reflected in the explosion of international governmental and non-
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Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997:145; Boli and Thomas 1999). “In many areas
of social life, common models organized in world discourse arise and penetrate
social life worldwide” (Meyer 1998:2). Relatedly, political discourse is
increasingly organized around highly reified and stylized reference to varying
models – as in current discussion of social welfare programs, labor market
regulation, or types of capitalism (with their references to “American models” or
to reconfigurations of a “European model”). This heightened reflexivity (of a
sort) intensifies the social movement-like qualities of institutional change (by
speeding institutional copying and creating ideological waves of reform).
Ideological intensification and integration, together with increasing economic
integration, has been a driving force behind the following changes.
Change in Social Composition/Coordination
Corporate organization has been transformed (partly through overt
reconstruction, as with Germany and Japan). This transformation emerges as a
central theme in Colin Crouch’s recent magisterial survey of “social change in
Western Europe” (Crouch 1999): he highlights a fragmentation of Europe’s
traditional corporate structures – organized religion, the patriarchal family,
political party blocks, subcultural “pillars.” These forms are deconstructed; their
authority over members “collapses” (p. 407). Nevertheless in comparative
perspective Europe remains highly and relatively formally organized, but now in
different ways: ways tied to an evolving “ethic of individualism” (p. 408).
Crouch’s summary picture, based upon a remarkable empirical synthesis,
can be given additional analytic formulation via the conceptualization offered in
this paper. The social-organizational structures of the more corporate European
systems especially (Germanic, Nordic) have retained a corporate form, and
society is still envisioned in a communal way. But the internal corporate
elements (communities, sectoral elites, occupational groupings) are now less
reified; they exist organizationally to some degree, but they derive their
legitimacy not from their historical standing as distinct corporate orders, but
from the rights and needs of individuals, together with the imagined functional
requirements of the national (and increasingly European) political system.
European integration has reinforced and intensified this reconstruction. It
has further compromised European national “corporatist” interest
intermediation, and has encouraged more pluralist (associational) and multilevel
repertoires (Schmitter and Grote 1997). As Crouch and others suggest,
individuals have gained more independent public standing, and also have access
to liberal (associational) repertoires that provide useful means for breaking away
from more corporate embeddings. A kind of collectivized individualism has
begun replace the earlier corporate cultures – a point to be returned toRSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 33
momentarily – and hence from the corporate side the distance between the
corporate and the associational systems has lessened. (In Japan as well scholars
have found signs of declining group loyalty, both in business and family
domains, associated with the importation of ideas of individual, ethnic, and
gender rights from world society [Murakami 1987; Pharr 1990].)
Over the same period (the 1960s onward) one can also detect a vestigial
corporatization of the associational polities. First, the differing “interest group
liberalisms” (Lowi 1969) of the U.S. and England have taken on proto-corporate
elements, with interest group sectors successfully colonizing segments of an
expanded governmental apparatus (Lowi 1969; Beer 1965, 1982). Second, via
the emergence of ideas of group rights, and more recently, of more intensified
“multicultural” identities, various population segments (ethnic, racial, linguistic,
sexual, physical) have attained proto-corporate status (Piccone 1991; Mann
1995). The more traditional associational imagery of a common citizenship
dominating other possible identities – common to both French and U.S.
cosmologies – has become less hegemonic, especially in the U.S. These
developments seem real enough, but they remain politically contested and hence
unstable (and they are not yet well accounted for or even well conceptualized).
Nevertheless, from the associational side as well, the differences between
corporate and associational organization have both changed and diminished.
Change in Collective Agency
Along the second dimension of the paper – collective agency – the statist and
societal models have also arguably become less distinct – even though the
modern systems have continued to differ substantially in the ways they allocate
collective agency. There is clear historical reason for this convergence. The
postwar era reflects both the consolidation and demise of modern statism: it is
both the era of the welfare and planning state – the realization of the state as an
organizational apparatus – and also of the decline of the myth of the state (cf.
Mann 1993). This dialectical history has generated standardization and
convergence.
Thus, the expansive statist visions of the 1950s and ‘60s (with its imagery
of state “tutelage” of society and “commanding heights”), and the rapid
increases in governmental expenditures of the 1960s and ‘70s, were followed
(after economic crisis and international institutional reconfigurations) by the
neoliberal assaults and market enthusiasms of the 1980s and ‘90s. In this last
period, liberal logics – interest group rhetorics, ideologies of consultation and
transparency, market enthusiasms – have been taken up aggressively by aspiring
political actors and change-agents even in the statist systems (for instance, see
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sovereignty (in macroeconomic and security matters) both reflect and drive a
broader compromising of statist logics (Smelser with Badie and Birnbaum
1994). The European integration project is itself set explicitly against the
charismatic state model. Further, much agenda-setting is now worked out (if
“confusedly” [Mann 1998]) at the transnational level, in one way or another,
rather than by separate statist projects.
33 This development further drains state
charisma.
This phenomenon is quite general: tellingly, scholars detect dimming of
state charisma in Japan (although obviously to a far lesser degree than in
Europe).
 34 Beginning with the Occupation and emerging more clearly in the
1990s, ideas of rights have taken hold in Japan and are replacing ideas of duty-
based citizenship. Environmental, women’s, consumer’s, and minority-rights
movements have emerged and have initiated both protest and legal action (in the
case of the Ainu indigenous movement, tellingly, successful litigation on the
basis of UN Declaration of Indigenous and Minority Rights). Nongovernmental
organizations are taking off, if from a very low base; there is a growing notion
of a public right to information. Governmental elites have tried to co-opt such
developments, using state-organized advisory councils and mediation systems to
remove contestation from public view and to tame it (Pempel 1982; Van
Wolferen 1989). Nevertheless the developments seem to mark a real departure
from one scholar referred to as the "exclusively state-oriented Japanese concept
of publicity..." (Matsumoto 1978:50) – and hence some reduction of Japanese as
well as European statism.
It has been the state mythos – statism as model – that has suffered in the
contemporary world system more than actual governmental responsibilities
(though the latter have certainly been reconfigured). The increasingly global
political culture continues to work out new public responsibilities for states: for
example, various “social charters” involving the environment or family or health
or professions (Mann 1993:138-39; Meyer 1999). This form of transnationalism
expands governmental jurisdiction and activities. However, it does so via the
stimulation of organizational and interest fragmentation (Meyer 1999). States
are increasingly networks of professionalized “receptor sites” tied as much to
broader interest, movement, and epistemic environments as to one another
(Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; Meyer 2000). Accordingly, scholars of
public administration find (and often decry) “fragmented and disarticulated
states” world-wide, with (by traditional standards) unclear organizational and
jurisidictional structures (for example, Frederickson 1999).
                                                          
33 For instance, 70 percent of Dutch legislation involves implementation of EU initiatives.
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This expansion and fragmentation has been apparent in the societal-
agency systems as well as the historically more statist ones. Governmental
activity and functions expanded massively in all the societal-agency polities, the
Anglo ones as well as Nordic, during the post-war period. Reflecting upon this
phenomenon, some scholars have even claimed (controversially) that an
institutional transformation has occurred: that collective agency has been
increasingly been transferred to the state in the previously less-statist systems,
with society less legitimated as the source of collective purposes and action (for
instance, Gress 1988 on the Nordic systems; to some extent Ginsberg and
Shefter 1999 and Piccone 1991 on the U.S.; Beer 1982 on Britain). Whatever the
merits of this particular assessment, the underlying developments do seem to
reflect convergence in institutionalized models of collective agency as well as in
those of social organization.
Current Change (Including Change in Collective Identity)
Considering the two dimensions of structuration together, one finds the
following variation in the current historical period. One can still demarcate more
and less corporate sociopolitical organization. But now the more corporate
systems remain distinctive by operating more corporately at the national level;
they have partly deconstructed their previously highly corporate micro- and
meso-structure. (This is less true of course in Southern Europe, where the
family-based structuration is still constitutive, and it goes without saying that
Japan remains distinctively and highly corporate in social organization.) One
can also still demarcate more and less politically centralist models, but the
contrast is now less stark than that observable in earlier eras: there is no longer
such a sharp contrast between organization around myths of the state versus
around myths of society.
Unsurprisingly institutional convergence is especially prominent among
the continental European polities, and it is worth calling particular attention to
this phenomenon. These polities have sustained a communal character when
compared with the liberal systems. For example, there is still a more expansive
conceptualization of collective goods than in the liberal systems: to take an
emblematic example, public spaces – and cities in general – retain more status as
sacrosanct collective goods (Crouch 1999:402). Relatedly, a distinctive
“substantive” and “reflexive” law (and associated administrative traditions)
continue to carry the European communal and statist legacies (Ladeur 1995;
Peters 1996).
But the underlying cultural model of the polity has changed dramatically
on the European continent. Employing the conceptualization advanced in theRSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 36
basic theoretical section above, one might advance the following tentative
sketch.
35
First, the dominant images of the polity in Europe – speaking now of
public and normative accounts, not necessarily mass sentiments – depict a rather
more mundane organization, governed by an imagined natural rationalism,
rather than the more sacralized and charismatic project characteristic of the high
nationalist period. The dramaturgy of mobilized nationalism and citizenship, in
(national-) cultural competition, is greatly reduced. In this (European) picture
the polity no longer really organizes for truly charismatic “nations”: nations
experience substantial ontological deflation, and begin to be imagined more like
ethnicities within a broader and more fundamental cultural identity.
36 At a
minimum these national identities are highly “relativized” to one another
(Waters 1995): countries may compete for leadership, but the primary
legitimated identity is now a broader “community” of nations, carrying a
broader world project, with (imagined) universal natural rationality, natural
human rights, and science as guiding lights. This political “disenchantment” of
countries, in Weber’s sense, is of course particularly pronounced in Europe. The
European integration project is now the most charismatic political venture in
Europe – and it decidedly does not have the kind of charisma that Weber had in
mind (cf. Mann 1998).
Second, as nations have lost ontological standing, and states charisma,
individuals in the emergent model have attained greater public standing than
before, relative to government, corporate bodies, and collective identities
generally. The polity is now envisioned as something like an intendedly rational
organization of the conceived natural inclinations of individuals, and of the
collective functions and entitlements imagined to follow from a universalistic
“natural law” of human rights and morality. However, in Europe the expanded
individualism takes a particular form: individuals are represented more as valued
members of the polity, bearing natural rights, rather than as empowered citizens
with voluntarist responsibilities in a common spiritual mission. (This latter
model, the original American one, is still present in the U.S. though in decayed
form.)
                                                          
35 The next paragraphs draw upon recent work by John Meyer and his colleagues (for
example, Meyer 1998, 1999, 2000; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Meyer and
Jepperson 2000).
36 This imagery is especially apparent in the highly reconstructed history and civics texts,
which carry cutting edge and legitimated discourses. For instance, McEneaney and Meyer
2000 report on studies of changes in national educational curricula. They note striking world-
wide declines in teaching of national histories, languages, literatures, art and music, and shifts
toward social studies and eclectic cultural appreciation. They see such shifts as moves away
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EXPLANATORY UTILITY
The primary objective of this paper – to delineate further a fundamental range of
institutional variation – has now been pursued. This section moves to the
secondary objective of the paper: illustration of the additional explanatory utility
to be gained by invoking polity models to help to account for variation in many
different domains of social activity. This section outlines explanatory
applications concerning: formal organizations, agenda and policy formation,
collective participation and action, and identity formation. The outline includes
examples of direct applications of the ideas of this paper, applications of closely
related ideas, and potential applications. The intention is stimulate both more
theoretical systematization and more development of this kind of institutional
analysis.
A concern throughout will be to show that institutional effects are not
limited to the operation of institutions as opportunity/constraint structures for
exogenously given actors and relationships. (This is arguably still the dominant
conceptualization of institutional effects in sociology and [in particular] political
science.) Instead institutional effects also include the operation of institutional
models in “constituting” sociopolitical identities or scripting the enactments of
identities. This contrast will be exemplified throughout and commented upon at
the conclusion of the section.
Formal Organizations
A substantial body of comparative work has charted cross-national or cross-
cultural variation in formal-organizational fields and structures (see Pugh 1976,
Hofstede 1980, and Scott 1987 for reviews). In one sociological institutionalist
argument, Jepperson and Meyer (1991) argued that much of this variation
clusters around there different types of polities: “liberal,” “statist,” and
“corporatist.” The argument proceeds as follows. The liberal polity (they
concentrate upon the U.S.), in organizing around social actors, has historically
produced extensive formal organizing, with organizational structures
coordinating activity more than tightly controlling persons. The corporatist
polity (they refer to Germany), in organizing more around constructed social
functions, also has produced substantial formal organizing, but with different
structures. These tend to feature more explicit differentiation and control over
persons. The statist polity (they refer to France), organizing around both actors
and functions, has suppressed formal organizing in society and has produced
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The authors are able to allege a strong linkage of organizational cultures
to polity types, and hence suggest the explanatory utility of invoking variant
polity types. However they do not fully develop the causal connections between
the two orders of variation. A fuller typology of polities, along the lines
suggested in this paper, might facilitate excavation of these mechanisms and
make apparent an even clearer organizational clustering.
Agenda and Policy Formation
Frank Dobbin’s work (Dobbin 1994a, 1996), mentioned in the Introduction,
powerfully illustrates variation, institutionalization, and generative effects of
distinct political cosmologies. A main analytical point of his study of railroad
development and industrial policy formation in the U.S. and France is that
interpretations of railroad development were constructed via the myth of the
state in France (and via its absence in the U.S.). These interpretations confirmed
pre-existing political cosmologies and were powerfully consequential for the
subsequent divergent development of industrial policies. This kind of analysis
could be further generalized to other countries, using the kind of distinctions
developed herein.
In a related example, also illustrating how foundational institutional
models can construct issues and agendas, Meyer et al. (1988) consider variation
in constructions of family violence and child protection. In institutional settings
establishing the individual (and its rights) as foundational elements of social
structure, child or spouse abuse (they argue) will more readily become matters
of public jurisdiction than in settings where the individual is less constitutional.
In contexts where families have a more corporate character, and where such
family groupings are basic elements of social structure (such as in many Latin
American settings), child or spouse abuse matters are less likely to enter the
public sphere and become salient issues.
This kind of argumentation could be consolidated and generalized. The
underlying idea, ubiquitous but still not extendedly developed, is that any basic
institutional model makes certain types of issues more likely to arise than others
(Douglas 1986). For example, much American social organization is constituted
by rules defining the individual and its rights. In such a context, many issues
arise having a religiomoral form, concerning the proper definition or obligations
of personhood, and the proper coordination of rights. The politicization of
abortion, for example, becomes more likely. And because of the American
concentration upon establishing enforceable norms about individual rights,
ready compromises about abortion become more difficult to establish. (See
Glendon 1987 for a comparative discussion of abortion and partial example of
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Further, any institutional configuration will embody conflicts between its
different organizing principles, thus establishing persistent contradictions that
reveal themselves in social issues (Friedland and Alford 1991). An example is
provided by U.S. dramas of personal versus social responsibility. American
discussions of "poverty," for example, have been highly constrained, rhetorical,
and repetitive in part because they so readily become morality plays, focusing so
centrally on individual responsibilities and "moral hazards." It is difficult for this
discussion to take other directions without violating depictions of individual
autonomy that have canonical status. Discussion of poverty can be proceed more
straightforwardly in settings where the individual is less reified as an
autonomous actor, and also where various "intermediate" groupings (families,
communities, occupations, sectors, churches) have more corporate status, and
can be assigned more collective responsibilities (Korpi 1980). A parallel
example can be found in American discussion of educational reform. Once
again, ideas of individual autonomy and choice construct and delimit discussion.
It is difficult in this context to generate serious consideration of a European-style
vocational education system, for instance, with its explicit tracking and
apprenticeship elements. In continental Europe, where the individual in part
occupies a social role that is under some degree of public jurisdiction and
control, these practices seem more natural and legitimate. The difficulty of
generating serious vocational/career counseling programs in the U.S. is a direct
reflection of American individualist mythology.
Collective Participation and Action
Analysts increasingly invoke institutional structures as “opportunity structures”
inducing or constraining activity – this is the staple imagery of so-called
“historical institutionalism” (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). For
instance, in a core analysis of this sort, Herbert Kitschelt (1986) argued that the
organizational structure and policy-making capacities of different political
systems affected the strategies and outcomes of antinuclear protest movements.
This basic form of institutional analysis – the “ecological” constraint or
inducement of the strategic action of actors whose identities and interests are
largely taken-for-granted analytically – can be supplemented. For instance, in
his work on “states and social movements” Pierre Birnbaum posits both
ecological and constitutive effects of institutional structuration. Consider his
following sketch: “In strong states the state is the absolute tutelary power on
which all hopes are pinned but against which people also feel inclined to rebel
[…]. Many collective actions […] are launched against the state. […] [M]assive
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shunted into civil society with a minimum of state involvement” (Smelser with
Birnbaum and Badie 1994:67-68).
In a set of analyses that invokes institutional variation closely related to
that discussed in this paper, Elizabeth Boyle explores cross-national variation in
legal activity and strategies (Boyle 1998; Boyle forthcoming). She considers
possible effects of the degree to which government structures are buffered from
society (“state/society differentiation”) and of the organizational
centralization/decentralization of government. Empirically she finds that (1)
lower state/society differentiation and lower centralization both lead to higher
individual recourse to legal activity. In addition, (2) lower differentiation leads
to higher citizen resort to the international legal community (specifically, higher
human rights petitions to the European Convention System). Statism suppresses
such claims. Also, (3) the two institutional variations appear to have affected the
amount, focus, and effect of antinuclear power litigation in the 1970s,
comparing the U.S., W. Germany, France, and Sweden. These results illustrate
the explanatory import of the kind of institutional variation analyzed in this
paper. They also recommend a further isolation and explication of the specific
causal mechanisms linking institutional structure and outcomes.
In this connection, a forthcoming analysis directly applies the institutional
distinctions developed in this paper. Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2000)
analyze cross-national variation in the construction of and participation in
voluntary associations (ranging from “old” social movement associations, to
“new” social movement associations, to religious associations). The guiding
idea is that different institutional orders will construct different types of
associational and membership structures in society, and be more or less
encouraging of individual participation in them. In statistical analyses of cross-
national survey reports (the World Values Study), the authors find that (1)
“statism” negatively affects levels of association, generally; (2) “corporateness”
positively affects participation in “old” social movements (unions, professional
groups, political parties); and (3) a general world shift is apparent (1970-90s)
toward more liberal, non-corporate patterns of association. This paper seems
directly to confirm the explanatory power of the distinctions developed in this
paper.
This sort of analysis could be extended to politico-cultural change in
single countries (or groups of countries). For instance, the political science
literature is full of posited puzzles concerning the relatively rapid decline of U.S.
"civic culture" orientations since the 1970s: for example, declining public
confidence in institutions (Lipset and Schneider 1983), together with shifts in
patterns of public activity (for example, the rise of more claimant, social
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to institutional changes in the American polity: the expansion and centralization
of state functions and activity; the nascent corporatizing of interest and ethnic
groups within a liberal constitutional framework; changes in the position of the
U.S. in the world economy and polity (Kamens #; Jepperson and Kamens 1985.)
Opportunities for this sort of analysis have not been much exploited.
Identities
Collective identities
A number of analysts have invoked institutional structure as a matrix for identity
formation, if in various ways. For instance, Smelser, Birnbaum, and Badie
invoke the French “model” of “a militant citizenry with rationalist ideals”; a
model of citizenship that “leaves traditional values exclusively to the private
realms” and “rejects any collective form of ethnic-based organization.” The
“principle of universalistic integration supported by a strong state…” then
generates a distinctive immigration politics (Smelser with Birnbaum and Badie
1994:69). Rogers Brubaker’s analyses of national membership take a similar
analytical form (1990, 1992). Yasemin Soysal’s book on “incorporation
regimes,” already mentioned, directly develops the idea that such regimes are
based upon previously institutionalized models of national membership (Soysal
1994). Variation in the main locus of collective authority (in society versus in
state) and in the organizational configuration of the state (more/less centralized)
are the main axes around which the organizing models vary. In each of these
analyses, foundational models are seen as constructing both organizing regimes
and identity configurations.
Individual Identities.
Foucault’s work famously focussed on the “constitution of the modern subject.”
A direct implication of sociological institutionalism is that the different modern
polities construct “the subject” differently. The starting idea is that modern
nation-states are cultural models “variously committed to individualism” (Frank,
Meyer, and Miyahara 1995:362). For instance, David Frank et al. studied
national variation in the size of the psychology profession, expecting that the
greater the individualism of the polity, the greater the prominence of
professionalized psychology – due to the greater salience of issues of
psychological identity in the more individualistic cultural models. In their
empirical analysis they found strong indication of this pattern: for example, the
size of the profession (incorporating various controls) clustered in the following
order (high to low)– Protestant countries, Socialist countries, Catholic Europe,
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This line of analysis can be pursued in the following way.
37 The cultural
models of each of the individualistic polities (as the above authors suggest) all
give the individual a theorized public identity and status. Accordingly, there is
every reason to think that people in these polities employ highly structured
cultural scripts – for talking, for behaving, for “experiencing” society, even,
more deeply, for assembling a distinctive personal identity. As the cultural
models vary, we should then expect individuals’ public postures, behavior, talk,
sentiment, opinion, and perceived experience to vary in highly structured
corresponding ways. We should expect this both because people receive
distinctly scripted public identities across polity types, and because they report
on differently constructed public orders.
Extensive evidence seems to bear out these expectations. For instance, (a)
despite all the internal diversity that can be present within countries, a person’s
national membership – the passport s/he carries – has been a master and
powerful predictor of features of individual identity and opinion. Also, (b) the
variation does seem to cluster around different types of polity.
38 For example,
people in the more liberal systems offer more expansive opinion and claim more
public efficacy than people elsewhere. They do so not necessarily because of
differences in depth socialization or in personal “values,” but more likely
because they are enacting a distinctive model of citizenship. People in the statist
systems show less of the exaggerated emphasis on voluntarism and individual
responsibility found in the liberal systems. Instead organizing models in the
more statist systems not only reflect more hierarchic imagery and practice, but
also more “subject” constructions (and parallel enactments) of citizenship. The
extent of scripting within dominant institutional models is extensive – there is
strong evidence that even the main lines of individuals’ “experience” of or
"reactions" to society are highly collectively codified and tutored. For instance,
statist models tend to include collectively codified scripts of political alienation
or rebelliousness, and, accordingly, more enactments of such behavior.
In effect, then, one can entertain and assess the argument that different
institutional logics construct different forms of modern individualism. In so
doing, the ideas of this paper may assist in bringing additional order to the rather
scattered literature on national variation in personal and public identity (that is,
in “selfways,” habitus, interaction rituals, and types of citizenship) [for example,
Hofstede 1980; Peabody 1985; Markus and Kitayama 1991]. From this line of
argument it also follows that any major reconfigurations of institutional models
–- as with current European integration – will likely change the scripting of
individual sociopolitical identity in highly structured ways. For instance,
                                                          
37 This example draws upon work by the current author.
38 In this paper I must leave these statements as allegations without providing documentation.
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European integration (and the reconstruction of organizing models that it has
entailed) are almost certainly implicated in the much-mentioned but little
theorized “increasing individualism” of contemporary Europeans.
39
An Analytical Note
This discussion of individual identity illustrates the following analytical point.
In this particular case, it does not seem reasonable to represent people’s
behavior as citizens and members as an external-causal adaptation to the
opportunities and constraints provided by institutional structure. Rather it seems
more plausible to represent such behavior, in the first instance, as endogenous to
institutional models. That is, this empirical domain arguably provides an
example of rather full institutional construction, wherein both identities, and
behavioral scripts for the standard enactment of such identities, are highly
codified and routinized collectively. Obviously not all domains of activity have
this particular causal relation to polity structure. One might consider the
following sketch of possibilities.
First, as with this example, we can consider what one might call "intra-
polity” linkages. In this case the causal allegation is that an outcome exists
because it is a part of the polity model. Some of Dobbin’s arguments about
industrial policy formation have this character: Dobbin is arguing, at least in
part, that main lines of industrial policy are a continuation of main lines of polity
development. One of Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2000) arguments is that
part of polity development in some systems proceeds via the construction of
certain kinds of associational structures (an argument in keeping with
Tocqueville’s characterization of the American system, for example).
Arguments of this sort would seem to be a necessary corrective to the more
dominant non-phenomenological imageries in social science, that tend to bracket
                                                          
39 If fully developed, this line of argument should provide for a more direct account of
macrovariation in individual identities then attempts to ground such variation in depth
socialization (as in earlier problematic ideas of “national character”) or in social-
psychological reactions to experience of social organization. Such linkages undoubtedly exist
to some degree, but there is reason to cast doubt on their strength and centrality. Such
arguments have great difficulty in accounting for the homogeneity of talk and identity
postures within national settings; the relatively limited connections between individuals’ talk
and postures and their social positions or experiences or personalities; or their capacity and
propensity to take up new talk and postures as collective circumstances change, or as they
move from one society to another. Such conventional social psychological lines of argument,
further, must rely upon rather elaborate and multilink social psychologies to connect
socialization or experience to identity features and talk, and must deny the powerful
indications of direct institutional construction and enactment – both questionable moves.RSC 2000/36 © 2000 Ronald L. Jepperson 44
(or simply miss) the degree of collective “scripting” of social life in the modern
polities (Meyer and Jepperson 2000).
40
Second, already established institutional models can be extended into new
social or polity domains. Soysal’s argument about the construction of distinctive
“immigration regimes” has this character: she says that core polity models serve
as schemas for the construction of regimes for coping with immigration
challenges.
Third, there is the “inter-institutional” idea that analytically separable
institutional domains – for instance, the organizational fields of the economy –
are partly adaptations to previously institutionalized polity models. The paper by
Jepperson and Meyer on variation in formal organizing seems to posit this sort
of connection.
These distinctions may be too sharp, or non-optimal. Further, any given
argument might posit multiple linkages between institutional models and
outcomes. At the same time, consideration of this set may give indication of the
kind of analytical clarification that is now possible given the empirical and
theoretical resources of the literature.
CONCLUSION
The take-off point of this paper has been the idea that the polities of the
European states system, due to the cultural and competitive framework of this
system, organized around distinct variants of a common cultural model. The
model, bequeathed by Christendom, pictured various competitive projects, all
rationalizing their social organization and their systems of collective agency.
Distinct models for pursuing this common rationalization consolidated in
the “long nineteenth century” (Hobsbawm). They varied, on the one hand,
depending on whether a structure of social relations remained central (the
corporatist variant), or whether more emphasis was placed on constructing a
system of social actors (the associational variant). They varied, on the other
hand, depending upon whether the operative model of collective agency featured
                                                          
40 Causal accounts from so-called “historical institutionalism,” for example – as one
prominent example of structural or socio-organizational imagery – emphasize structural
features of society (such as economic or class structure) or of government (such as party
systems, electoral systems, specific organizational features of the state). In addition, they
emphasize adaptation to organizational arrangement, rather than enactment of models.
Accounts of this sort can in principle generate explanations that either compete with or
complement the explanations offered herein. A rare overt attempt to compare different sorts
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a charismatic center – the state – or instead an active societal community.
Considering these variations together one can in fact discern four dominant
polity models in the Europe-centered “world system.” These four models help us
to theorize more clearly the actual historical differentiation, development, and
contemporary change of the modern polities.
In addition, invoking these differing institutional models can help in
explaining cross-national variation in social structuration, agenda and policy
formation, and identity formation. This explanatory utility flows from the
generative operation of polity models: that is, wide ranges of social life are
arguably scripted extensions or enactments of dominant models of the polity.
This paper has simply tried to consolidate and systematize a few basic
intellectual results on these topics. A number of further efforts along these lines
would seem warranted. First, there is need for fuller analytical specification of
the idea of institutional models, and of their dimensions. Second, as already
mentioned, there is need for fuller reconstruction of the historical “genealogies”
of models – an issue treated only en passant in this paper. Third, there is need
for further analytical development of the different ways in which institutional
models operate as causes. Fourth, along with such further development, there is
need to bring this form of institutionalism more fruitfully into juxtaposition with
other forms of institutional and structural argumentation. This paper has tried to
stimulate and facilitate these broader efforts. Further clarification of the more
general dimensions that underlie fundamental differences among the modern
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